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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
BREACH OF WARRANTY - PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Plaintiff Craig claimed compensatory and punitive damages in a
breach of warranty action against Spitzer Motors of Columbus for
misrepresenting the condition of a 1957 Dodge.1 The salesman
claimed the car was a demonstrator's model with only 51 miles on it,
when in fact he knew that the automobile had been repossessed after
the first owner had used it to haul a house trailer from Ohio to
Florida. After forcing the plaintiff to elect to rescind or to affirm
the contract of sale, the trial court granted defendant's motion to
strike plaintiff's allegation of malicious fraud and a prayer for puni-
tive damages. To justify its action, the court relied on the rule that
in a suit for fraud the measure of damages is the difference between
the value of the car as represented and the actual value received.
When the claim for punitive damages was stricken, plaintiff suffered
final judgment and appealed to the Franklin County Court of Ap-
peals, where the case was reversed and remanded to the trial court.
The higher court refused to recognize defendant's contention that
punitive damages could not be awarded in a breach of warranty ac-
tion. It held that the obligation of express warranty is one imposed
by law, and an action for its breach was originally considered to be
a tort action. Thus, plaintiff's petition was declared sufficient to
sustain claims of punitive as well as compensatory damages.
Although the technical common-law forms of action have been
abolished in states where code pleading exists, the inherent distinc-
tions between actions ex contractu and actions ex delicto linger on.'
The validity of these distinctions in actions for fraud in the sale of
personal property is doubtful. A petition alleging the existence of a
contract and a breach by the defendant for misrepresenting the con-
sideration or the subject of the contract is usually held to sound in
contract,3 while one that alleges the sale, the fraud, and the breach of
duty owed to the plaintiff by the defendant is held to sound in tort,
4
even though the fact situations are similar. An action ex contractu
will preclude a plaintiff from recovering punitive damages, 5 except
in cases of breach of promise to marry,6 and those in which an inde-
pendent wilful tort has been committed. 7 An action in tort may in-
clude punitive damages. The issue as to whether a certain petition
sounds in tort or contract is especially important in Ohio because of
the rule that a pleading sounding in tort cannot be amended so as to
1. Craig v. Spitzer Motors of Columbus, Inc., 160 N.E.2d 537 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959).
2. De Fiore v. Peffers, 124 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio Ct. App. 1955); OHIO JUR, 2d Actions § 16
(1953).
3. Ketcham v. Miller, 104 Ohio St. 372, 136 N.E. 145 (1922).
4. De Fiore v. Peffers, 124 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio Ct. App. 1955).
5. Ketcham v. Miller, 104 Ohio St. 372, 136 N.E. 145 (1922).
6. Duvall v. Fuhrman, 5 Ohio C.C.R. 305 (Cir. Ct. 1887).
7. P., C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Ensign, 6 Ohio C.C. Dec. 616 (1894).
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change the action into one sounding in contract and vice versa.' A
new development in this problem occurred in 1958 when the Ohio
Supreme Court in Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Company' held
that privity of contract was not necessary to recover for breach of an
express warranty. The court did not state whether breach of war-
ranty is a tort or a contract action. Thus, breach of warranty in
Ohio now seems to be a separate action, which contains elements of
both tort and contract.
A further problem is that any action involving the sale of per-
sonal property should be pleaded to conform to the provisions of the
Ohio Sales Act. 10 However, a breach of warranty action claiming
fraud could be classified under three different sections of the Sales
Act." The remedy under each section is different. As would be ex-
pected, the cases in Ohio have been inconsistent because of the al-
ternative remedies provided by the act. For example, in Saberton v.
Greenwald,2 an action for fraud in the sale of a watch was held to
be ex delicto and not forbidden by Ohio Revised Code section
1315.70 or section 1315.74. The Ohio Supreme Court in that case
held that had the action been in contract, section 1315.70 of the Ohio
Revised Code would apply; but since it was a tort action, plaintiff's
remedy must conform to section 1315.74 of the Ohio Revised Code.
For this reason a verdict including punitive damages was upheld.
In Lucas v. Burt W. Kemmerling Company,'" the same problem
was viewed in a slightly different way. In that case plaintiff was
defrauded in the sale of a truck and sued for breach of warranty. He
claimed special damages under section 1315.71 of the Ohio Revised
Code to recover for a loss incurred when he was forced to breach a
contract with a third party because of the defective condition of the
truck he had bought. The court held that the breach of this contract
presented some evidence of damage, but that a better method to de-
termine damages was to find the reasonable value of the loss suf-
fered from plaintiff's inability to use the truck due to the seller's
breach of warranty. Thus, the question of special damages was given
to a jury for determination.
In each of these cases, there was a sale and a breach of a condi-
8. De Fiore v. Peffers, 124 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio Ct. App. 1955).
9. 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958).
10. Omo REv. CODE §5 1315.01-.76.
11. OHro REv. CODE 5 1315.70(D): "The measure of damages for breach of warranty is
the loss directly and naturally resulting, in the ordinary course of events from the breach of
warranty." § 1315.71: "Sections 1315.01 to 1315.76 inclusive, of the Revised Code do not
affect the right of a buyer or a seller to recover interest or special damages in any case where
interest or special damages may be recoverable, or to recover money paid when the considera-
tion for the payment of it has failed." § 1315.74: "In any case not provided for.., the rules
of law and equity, including the law merchant, and in particular the rules relating to the law
of... fraud, (and] misrepresentation... shall apply to contracts to sell and to sales of goods."
12. 146 Ohio St. 414, 66 N.E.2d 224 (1946).
13. 115 N.E.2d 17 (Ohio Ct. App. 1953).
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tion of the sale. Yet, one court classified the action as a breach of
warranty, and the other as fraud. Each classification gives rise to
different remedies, both in common law and under the Sales Act. 4
Logically, a pleading of similar facts in different cases should entitle
the plaintiffs to similar remedies.
The court of appeals in the instant case, Craig v. Spitzer Motors
of Columbus, Incorporated,5 met this problem head on by holding
that (1) punitive damages may be awarded in a breach of warranty
action, and (2) the Ohio Sales Act does not exclude the right to puni-
tive damages. Although previous cases limited breach of warranty to
an action ex contractu,' 6 this court refused to classify breach of war-
ranty as a contract or a tort action. The decision seems to be in line
with the Toni case,17 for both decisions indicate that breach of war-
ranty is a separate action which requires elements of both tort and
contract to state a cause of action. The Craig case' 8 extended the
doctrine of the Toni case'" to allow recovery of punitive damages. It
held that the defendant cannot, by motion to strike, choose the words
plaintiff must use in his pleading in charging the defendant with
fraud. This leads to the conclusion that regardless of whether the
breach of warranty pleaded is ex contractu or ex delicto, an allegation
of fraud could make it possible for an award of punitive damages
where the facts so justify. This would seem to eliminate many tech-
nical stumbling blocks over which previous plaintiffs have fallen.
Although the Sales Act declares a specific remedy for breach of
warranty,2° this court disregarded the remedy and classified the ac-
tion under Ohio Revised Code section 1315.71, which allows a buyer
to recover special damages, and section 1315.74, which provides that
ordinary rules of law apply to cases not provided for in the Sales Act.
The Craig case2' seems to be a judicial adoption of the Uniform
Commercial Code section which provides that incidental and conse-
quential damages can be recovered under proper circumstances.2
However, the Uniform Commercial Code has not been adopted in
Ohio.
Although the Craig decision engages in some "judicial legisla-
tion," it should save plaintiffs from being denied the right to certain
remedies because they have pleaded in tort or contract. It is in line
14. OHIO REv. CODE 5 1315.01-.76.
15. 160 N.E.2d 537 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959).
16. Rachlin v. Libby-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 96 F.2d 597 (2nd Cir. 1938); Winterbottom v.
Wright, 10 M.&W. 109 (Ex. 1842).
17. Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958).
18. Craig v. Spitzer Motors of Columbus, Inc., 160 N.E.2d 537 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959).
19. Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958).
20. OHIO REv. CODE § 1315.70.
21. Craig v. Spitzer Motors of Columbus, Inc., 160 N.E.2d 537 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959).
22. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-714.
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